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Recent French Legal Developments 
Concerning a War-Time Arrest and 
Imprisonment Case 
 
VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN
†
 
Mais qu’est-ce que le savoir? Le savoir, c’est comme l’amour, il faut 
alimenter et nourrir cette lampe ardente de notre connaissance, de 
peur que son contenu même se dessèche, devienne théorique et 
s’inscrive en figures pâles et abstraites sur nos consciences           
vite en repos. 
 
Jacqueline Mesnil-Amar, Ceux qui ne dormaient pas  
_______________________ 
 
 
Some months ago, I gave a talk at the University of Maryland 
School of Law about the French Lipietz case, which had ignited 
 
† Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Unless otherwise noted, 
translations are mine. My thanks to Professor William Reynolds for his 
instantaneous contacting of student editors at the Maryland Journal of 
International Law to arrange for the publication of the three documents concerning 
the Lipietz case; to Dean Michael Van Alstine for inviting me to speak at the 
University of Maryland Law School; to Professor Peter Quint for being a 
wonderful host and for initiating the series of coincidences that led from Pittsburgh 
to Baltimore to Toulouse; and to Alisha L. Jacobsen and Juliana Galan for 
translating the two documents that follow my comments. 
 JACQUELINE MESNIL-AMAR, CEUX QUI NE DORMAIENT PAS, JOURNAL, 1944-
1946 190 (2d ed. Stock, 2009) (éditions de Minuit, 1957) (“But what is knowledge? 
Knowledge is like love, an ardent lamp that must be fed and nourished by our 
learning, for fear that its very contents may dessicate, become theoretical and 
inscribed in pale and abstract terms in our speedily quiescent consciences.”). 
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passions and passionate debate within France when a lower 
administrative court ruled for the plaintiffs.
1
 The dramatic facts of the 
case are recounted in the Advisory Opinion to that court, which 
follows.2 The facts concern the arrest and imprisonment by “Vichy 
France,” as the collaborationist 1940–44 war-time government of 
France is known, of two cousins deemed Jewish pursuant to that 
regime’s anti-Semitic laws.  
In the course of my talk, I mentioned that the Advisory Opinion of 
the commissaire du gouvernement,3 more or less the equivalent of the 
European Court of Justice’s Advocate General,4 had never been 
published in a French legal periodical or journal. Indeed, it had been 
rejected for publication, despite the controversy the case and 
judgment had spawned throughout the country, which ordinarily 
would have ensured its finding ready placement. By the end of my 
talk, to my astonishment, my kind hosts had secured an offer from the 
Maryland Journal of International Law to publish the Advisory 
Opinion, which follows these introductory remarks and on which the 
lower court’s decision was based.5  
The Advisory Opinion enters into greater detail than the court 
decision and refers to numerous cases which, taken together, 
buttressed the court’s judgment. As the reader may observe, the 
Advisory Opinion’s analysis of the statutory limitations period covers 
the Lipietz plaintiffs’ claims, but, given that the court decision was 
 
1. M. A et consorts Lipietz c/Préfet de la Haute-Garonne et Société nationale des 
chemins de fer français, No. 0104248, Tribunaux administratif de Toulouse [TA] 
[Administrative Court] June 6, 2006 (Fr.) [hereinafter Lipietz Decision], available 
at http://helene.lipietz.net/IMG/pdf/jugement.pdf. An English translation of the 
decision is available at http://lipietz.net/spip.php?article1891. 
2. See Conclusions de Jean-Christophe Truilhé, Commissaire du gouvernement, 
translated in 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 271 (2010) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]. 
3. The commissaires du gouvernement became known as rapporteurs publics on 
February 1, 2009. See Decree No. 2009-14 of January 7, 2009, Journal Officiel de 
la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], January 8, 2009, p. 
479. This change in an institution of French law that had existed since 1831 
followed a European Court of Human Rights decision which criticized the French 
institution as a violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. See Kress v. France, 2001–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-in-en. 
4. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and 
Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 363, 374 n.63 
(2008). 
5. See generally Lipietz Decision, supra note 1. 
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rendered in 2006, it also would have cut off future similarly situated 
plaintiffs within a few months from asserting a cause of action.6 The 
plaintiffs had argued several alternative theories with respect to the 
limitations period. First and foremost, they had urged the court to 
hold that no statute of limitations applied because the underlying acts 
were crimes against humanity.7 Under French law, the crime against 
humanity is unique in not being subject to a statute of limitations.8 In 
losing on this point, the plaintiffs did not subject their own case to 
defeat, but the innovative legal theory that had permitted them to seek 
legal recourse for harm, where similarly situated plaintiffs always had 
failed before,9 would be of extremely limited benefit to future 
plaintiffs unless a higher court reinterpreted the limitations period 
more favorably. This was not to happen. 
The plaintiffs had sued both the French government and the 
national railroad company, the société nationale des chemins de fer 
(SNCF). The French government never appealed the lower court’s 
verdict against it, but the SNCF did appeal, ultimately leading to the 
French Council of State, the supreme court of administrative law, 
affirming a reversal that the SNCF won from the Court of Appeals of 
Bordeaux.10 The Lipietz plaintiffs then applied to a European court, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Whether or not one 
considers the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice properly to 
be called supreme courts, the supranational European courts represent 
the final legal resort and ultimate appellate recourse. A finding of a 
violation on the French legal system’s part by the ECtHR would have 
signified the nullification of the French national decision. However, 
the ECtHR deemed the plaintiffs’ application to be inadmissible, so 
 
6. See Curran, supra note 4, at 389. 
7. See Lipietz Decision, supra note 1; Advisory Opinion, supra note 2. 
8. For an account of how this came about, see generally Vivian Grosswald 
Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy’s Suicide 
in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998). 
9. See Curran, supra note 4, at 386–88. One of those who had failed before, 
Kurt Schaechter, is mentioned in the essay of maître Rouquette. See Rémi 
Rouquette, The French Administrative Court’s Rulings on Compensation Claims 
Brought by Jewish Survivors of World War II, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 304 (2010). 
10. For the two appeals, see Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français c/ 
MM. Georges Lipietz et A., 06BX01570, Cour Administrative d’Appel de 
Bordeaux [CAA] [Court of Administrative Appeals], Mar. 27, 2007 (Fr.), available 
at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/France/Lipietz_Appel_27-3- 
2007.pdf; Mme L. et autres, No. 305966, Conseil d’Etat [CE] (High-administrative 
Court), Dec. 21, 2007 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/node.php? 
articleid=823. 
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the plaintiffs’ lower court victory stood against the government but 
not against the SNCF.11  
An additional document concerning Lipietz follows the Advisory 
Opinion in these pages: an essay by maître Rémi Rouquette, lawyer 
for the Lipietz plaintiffs.12 The reader will notice that maître 
Rouquette alludes to the Hoffman-Glémane case.13 Hoffman-Glémane 
was instituted in the aftermath of the lower court holding in Lipietz; 
the issue the Council of State resolved in that case was whether the 
statute of limitations had run against the French government. The 
Court held that it had.14 
The Lipietz case intertwines two important strands of European 
law. The first is the law’s role in dealing with collective memory, an 
issue that looms in many states from Europe to Africa. In France, 
attitudes towards the nation’s role during the Second World War have 
evolved politically, socially, historiographically, and legally. A 
second noteworthy strand of the case, not entirely unrelated to the 
first, is globalization’s effect on national law. 
With respect to Lipietz, my own previous attention has been 
concentrated primarily on this second strand,15 in particular on 
examining how the lower court decision, unchallenged by the 
government, marked a transition in French law that showed the 
effects of foreign, primarily American, tort law influence seeping into 
French domestic law. Among my theories as to why the Council of 
State ruled against the plaintiffs in Lipietz (and similarly in Hoffman-
Glémane) is the difficulty a civil law legal order would experience in 
adapting to a common law importation for which the surrounding 
legal terrain had not adequately been prepared, as is most likely to 
occur where, as here, the change is precipitated by a court decision.16 
In such situations, a society can be ill-equipped to handle the 
 
11. Lipietz v. France, E.Ct.H.R, (16 Dec. 2009, No. 49637/09), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=859949&por
tal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&tabl 
12. See Rouquette, supra note 9. 
13. Id. 
14. See Hoffman-Glémane, No. 315499, Conseil d’Etat [CE Ass.] (High-
Administrative Court), Feb. 16, 2009 (Fr.), available at http://arianeinternet.conseil 
etat.fr/arianeinternet/ViewRoot.asp?View=Html&DMode=Html&PushDirectUrl=1
&Item=1&fond=DCE&Page=1&querytype=advanced&NbEltPerPages=5&Pluriels
=True&dec_id_t=315499. 
15. See Curran, supra note 4. 
16. See id. at 398–400.  
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consequences of the initial change in law. 
Indeed, as maître Rouquette states, a vast number of new lawsuits 
were begun after the Lipietz plaintiffs won their case in 2006.17 They 
started almost immediately. In a comparable situation in the United 
States, most of those plaintiffs could have been members of a single 
class action lawsuit.18 Since nothing similar to the American class 
action suit exists in France, the Council of State was able to foresee 
how the already-taxed judiciary would reel under the burden of 
thousands of additional cases. Other problems also might be 
significant. Plaintiffs would not be able to secure legal services on a 
contingency basis, since contingency fees are impermissible in 
France, with concomitant financial strain on less prosperous 
plaintiffs.19 These difficulties indirectly would have resulted from 
globalization, inasmuch as Lipietz reflected foreign legal influences 
that caused an Anglo-Saxon style tort case to proceed outside of the 
criminal law framework, a framework which French law mandates 
 
17. See Rouquette, supra note 9. For an interview with two lawyers of post-
Lipietz plaintiffs, see Jordan Pillet, La SNCF rattrapée par les trains de la mort, 9 
CULTURE DROIT 16 (Sept.–Oct. 2006). 
18. For relevant comparative information in this area, see Rhonda Wasserman, 
Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (Univ. of Pitt. Legal Studies Research Paper Ser., 
Working Paper No. 2010-04), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a 
bstract_id=1554472. 
19. The contingency fee system is considered unethical under French law. 
Known as the pacte de quota litis, it is prohibited as against public policy, although 
a lawyer under some conditions may contract for remuneration based on “result.” 
See Law No. 71-1130 of December 31, 1971, modified by Decree No. 91-1197 of 
July 10, 1991, art. 10, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], July 11, 1991, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich 
Texte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068396&dateTexte=20100423. The French 
private law supreme court, or Cour de cassation, confirmed most recently in 
January 2010 that the laws permit contingency fee structures only in addition to, 
not in lieu of, a fixed fee structure. See Deuxiéme chambre civile [Cass. 2e civ.] 
[Second Civil Court of Appeal], Jan. 21, 2010, Bulletin des Arrêts, chambres 
civiles No. 2, Jan. 2010 (Fr.), available at http://www.avocatparis-bdd.org/GEIDE 
File/Cass_civ2_100121_07-10791.htm?Archive=196601391488&File=Cass+Civ+ 
21%2D01%2D2010+n%B007%2D10791+%28htm%29. The absence of a U.S.-
style contingency fee basis or class action suit would have posed a severe challenge 
to the French legal order. In the particular case of plaintiffs similarly situated to 
Lipietz et al., there appear, however, to have been a group of attorneys, l’ordre de 
Cicéron, prepared to take the work on a pro bono or greatly reduced basis. See 
Hélène Lipietz, L’Affaire Lipietz rebondit: Une demande d’avis au Conseil d’Etat 
audiencée le 6 Février 2009, at 3–4, Feb. 4, 2009, http://helene.lipietz.net/spip.php 
?article182. 
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for cases dealing with crimes against humanity.20  
Law’s transnationalization, or the second Lipietz strand, is not, 
however, the focus of the two documents that follow my remarks. 
The innovative Advisory Opinion by M. Truilhé explains the case 
and the law in detail, including how the case came to be brought so 
many years after the relevant events transpired. It covers the history 
of the French administrative courts, ostensibly through their 
reasoning on issues of statutes of limitations concerning acts by the 
Vichy French government. It also suggests what lay at the source of 
the statutory interpretations, some seemingly paradoxical: how it was, 
for instance, that the great French legal scholar and opponent of 
Vichy, René Cassin, laid the groundwork for a case law that had 
relieved the French governments of the Fourth and Fifth Republics of 
liability for crimes committed in the name of the French State by the 
1940–44 collaborationist government of Pétain.  
Those who suffered most during the dark years of Vichy were to 
learn that there were unsung heroes as well as collaborators and 
profiteers. Jacqueline Mesnil-Amar, a Jewish woman whose family 
had been French for many generations, wrote in Paris on July 29, 
1944, after the arrest of her beloved husband and from the depth of 
insight which tragedy can bring, that “real life is choosing” (la vraie 
vie, c’est choisir).21 M. Truilhé and the Administrative Court of 
Toulouse, which adopted his opinion as its own in almost all respects, 
made a choice consistent with great courage and a subtle, generous 
understanding of French legal history. The evolution from post-war 
governmental nonliability to liability involved complex issues.  
Initially, it had seemed most compelling for the post-war, 
democratic Fourth Republic to repudiate Vichy as illegal, 
consistently with the arguments de Gaulle and his legal advisors 
among the Free French had been making from London to their 
French compatriots in occupied France, as they urged the latter not to 
consider their duty or patriotism to consist in loyalty to the so-called 
Etat français, the “French State,” as Pétain dubbed his new regime to 
 
20. This is a principal theme of my article, Globalization, Legal 
Transnationalization and Crimes against Humanity: The Lipietz Case. See Curran, 
supra note 4. For a recent article on the interface in the French legal system 
between criminal and civil law, see Véronique Tellier, En finir avec la primauté du 
criminel sur le civil!, 4 REV. DE SCIENCE CRIM. & DR. PÉNAL COMPARÉ 797 (2009). 
21. MESNIL-AMAR, supra note *, at 34. 
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show its rupture with the republican past and, indeed, all that had 
flowed from the French Revolution. It then seemed logically 
irreconcilable for the newly reestablished Republic simultaneously to 
accept continuity for Vichy’s most heinous side in the form of legal 
liability. Thus, as a result of the immediate post-war reaction to assert 
that the Fourth Republic had no link whatsoever with the 
collaborationist regime of Vichy, and for an abundance of other 
reasons as well, victims of Vichy were not able to assert claims 
successfully against the new French government. As the years went 
by, the solutions adopted were to prove too simplistic and 
increasingly ill suited to the times. It was M. Truilhé’s advice to the 
Administrative Court of Toulouse to extend an already-evolving law 
to its logical conclusion. The court agreed, and the French 
government did not appeal, so the Advisory Opinion, which traces 
prior case decisions and legal reasoning in a manner that an official 
French court decision cannot do, remains a landmark, and its author 
one whose wide knowledge of his field has nourished it and kept it 
from desiccating, as Jacqueline Mesnil-Amar cautioned against in the 
words I quote at the beginning of these remarks.  
Maître Rouquette’s essay, which ends this trilogy, focuses on 
historical and legal aspects of the case from his unique perspective as 
a zealous advocate immersed in the history of his country and in his 
devotion to a cause. Like Mme Mesnil-Amar, he too is an opponent 
of the “quiescent conscience.” Both maître Rouquette and M. Truilhé 
will offer the American reader a glimpse into the thinking of French 
patriots who, as de Gaulle famously wrote of himself, continue to 
have a certain idea of France.  
 
